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 Abstract 
Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee are the most well-known members of the leadership of the 
Confederacy during the American Civil War. In the years following the war, both men became 
mythologized, transformed into something beyond humanity that we cannot reach. Lee becomes 
the “Reluctant Confederate,” who fought for the South out of duty rather than belief in rhetoric. 
Davis becomes an enigma, the “Sphinx of the Confederacy,” whose motivations are unknown to 
us mere mortals. In truth, both men are much simpler and much more human. They both believed 
in the Southern cause, with all the white supremacist and pro-slavery attitudes this represented, 
and the conflict they faced in 1861 was not lack of faith in the Southern system but a moderate 
stance on secession. After the war, both men made no secret of their desire to justify the actions 
of the South, and therefore themselves. Neither believed that they had done wrong in seceding, 
claiming it as a constitutional right. Davis and Lee are remembered not for their character but for 
their role in Confederate society. They are entirely human, and their enigmatic nature is in truth 
internal conflict, as they faced life-changing descisions as history was being made all around 
them. 
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Process Analysis Statement 
 The story of this thesis truly begins when I was in middle school. In middle 
school, essay writing was not an assignment as much as it was a punishment. At my school, 
serious misbehavior would be punished with writing assignments on why the rules you had 
broken were in place. These were assigned with no guidance and were enormously stressful for 
twelve-year-old me. It was sink or swim whether you wrote something acceptable. This 
experience made it very hard for me to write academically in the future. 
In high school, I suffered from writing anxiety even as I learned to write at a high school 
level and was routinely praised for my writing. Senior year stands out in particular because I 
simultaneously wrote the worst paper I ever wrote for a grade and two papers I am still proud of 
to this day. One was a research project on Henry VIII for a European History class, the first 
proper historical research paper I wrote, and the other was an assignment for English class. This 
English assignment stressed me out enormously, despite a three-page minimum length. In a 
strange twist, I wrote three pages before realizing I needed to double-space my paper. The 
resulting five-page paper was the first time I felt like I could write something lengthy and 
substantive for a writing assignment. 
Before college, I had never written anything longer than five or six pages. When I took 
EDPS 251 my Freshman year, I was expected to turn in a ten-page paper for my final project. 
What ended up making it manageable was that it neatly broke into smaller chunks of two to three 
pages. It would take a while before I learned to apply that lesson to other writing assignments. 
As I continued in college, I experienced ups and downs in writing. A refusal to change a 
topic that wasn’t working contributed to a mediocre paper turned in at the last minute after an 
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enormous amount of stress. I was fortunate to have good professors my first two years who 
helped me work through the stress of writing college-length papers. Still, the Honors thesis hung 
over my head like the Sword of Damocles. 
After several changes of major, I settled into majoring in History, which came with its 
own thesis, HIST 470. Having HIST 470 count as HONR 499 created enough stress before I 
even began writing. Nervous about a deadline that turned out to not exist, I submitted my 
proposal to the Honors College before I had finalized a topic. Brainstorming a topic for this 
project with my advisor, Dr. Stephen, was a process of narrowing down broad ideas. Dr. 
Stephen’s specialty was the Civil War era, and of that, the thing that fascinated me the most was 
General Sherman’s letter where he declares “you people of the South don’t know what you are 
doing,” and proceeds to explain in prescient detail how the North is militarily and 
technologically superior to the South. This letter led me to a letter of Robert E. Lee’s where he 
declares “secession is naught but revolution.” These two documents led me to the idea of 
Southern Unionists, which meant letting go of General Sherman, as he was a Northerner. This 
was where I was when I hastily submitted my thesis. 
Dr. Stephan, however, felt Southern Unionists was too broad a topic for my thesis, 
especially as I had planned to talk about political leaders, military figures, and civilians in 
multiple parts of the Confederacy as well as the border states. Talking with Dr. Stephan to 
narrow things down, I decided to focus on two major figures in the Confederacy, Lee and 
President Davis. The research I did quickly established than neither man was a Unionist, despite 
Lee’s quote above, but as I did more research and started writing, my finalized thesis and topic 
came into being. 
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As for the writing itself, I knew I needed to pace myself to write something this long. Dr. 
Stephan’s required minimum still approached twice the length of any paper I had written 
previously. He gave us good advice, however, that called back to my first success writing a paper 
of daunting length. Rather than think of it as a twenty-plus-page paper, think of it as three seven-
page papers connected together by analysis. The assignments for HIST 470 encouraged this 
process. A seven-page section draft was due one week, followed two weeks later by a fifteen-
page draft that was expected to include two sections and a draft of your introduction. My usual 
strategy of writing in big chunks on weekends wouldn’t work here, so I came up with a new 
approach. I set a goal for myself of writing one page a day. To avoid stress, I intentionally 
stopped after about a page of writing a day, even if I had more to say. I didn’t want this paper to 
overwhelm me; I wanted to be able to socialize and take time to myself instead of constantly 
writing and researching. 
When I approached the end of this project, I got a stimulating rush of euphoria that led to 
me writing five or more pages in a whirlwind of energy. I was so excited and relieved to be done. 
Writing this paper was strangely easier than I ever would have believed four years ago. The 
obstacles I encountered were either bureaucratic or my own misinterpretation of instructions and 
deadlines. Four and a half years of college prepared me for this project better than I ever realized 
until it was done. 
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Introduction 
The American Civil War is probably the most popular historical event in American 
History outside of living memory. Among casual historians, its battles and leadership are 
legendary. While an ordinary American probably could not name a single battle of the Mexican-
American War, or other nineteenth-century American conflicts, that same ordinary American 
could easily name a half-dozen battles of the Civil War. Because of this proliferation of 
information about the Civil War in the popular consciousness, the Civil War’s popularity has 
reached an almost mythical point. 
Perhaps no part of the Civil War has been mythologized more than the leadership of the 
Union and Confederacy. For example, historians who dare to critique Abraham Lincoln tread on 
thin ice when dealing with popular audiences. And despite losing the war, the Confederate 
leadership is no less mythologized. Among Confederate leaders, two names stand head and 
shoulders above the rest: General Robert E. Lee and President Jefferson Davis. 
Interestingly, the mythological Lee and Davis are staunch opposites. The Mythical Lee is 
the “Reluctant Confederate” and the “Great Conciliator,” while Davis is seen as the living 
embodiment of the Southern Cause. Whether that demonizes or glorifies him comes down to the 
opinions of individuals. And these mythologized images are not new phenomena. The idea of 
Lee as the “Reluctant Confederate” can be seen as early as 1866, in the book Life and 
Campaigns of General Robert E. Lee, written by James D. McCabe, Jr. In the book’s third 
chapter, entitled “Col. Lee Leaves the Federal Army,” McCabe writes that Lee “was motivated 
by no feeling of ambition or sectional hatred” in his decision to side with the Confederacy.1 As I 
discuss later in this essay, “sectional hatred” was absolutely a factor in Lee’s decision to secede. 
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Lee states many times that he has no love for the North and his sympathies lie with the South in 
the secession crisis. 
Lee’s mythic image would continue into the next century. As early as 1912, historian 
Gamaliel Bradford, Jr. notes with regret that Lee comes off as aggravatingly perfect,2 but still 
glosses over Lee’s Southern sympathies when discussing Lee’s decision to secede.3 The mythic 
Lee only grew stronger over the course of the 20th century. Writing in 1977, historian Thomas 
Connelly notes that “Lee the man has become so intertwined with Lee the hero symbol that the 
real person has been obscured.”4 Connelly’s ultimate picture of Lee is of a tragic figure who felt 
overwhelmed by his duties, who buried his self-doubt beneath a stoic façade.5 Alan T. Nolan, 
writing in 1991, credits Connelly with being the first to attack the mythic Lee, but accuses him of 
not going far enough in dismantling what Nolan views as inherent contradictions in Lee’s 
legacy.6 
Where Lee became mythologized almost immediately after the war, Jefferson Davis 
became an embodiment of the Southern Cause, making him a hero to Southern Apologists and a 
villain to the North. This made scholarly study of the man difficult. Writing in 1977, Clement 
Eaton notes that the previous seventy years’ worth of biographies of Davis are on the whole 
superficial and partisan.7 Eaton ultimately finds Davis an admirable man in a flawed society, yet 
dubs him the “Sphinx of the Confederacy,” implying an inscrutability to the man.8 The trend of 
lackluster Davis biographies unfortunately continued, as William C. Davis noted in 1991, 
accusing Eaton’s work of “Antiseptic Brevity,” and taking umbrage with the treatment of 
Jefferson Davis as an enigma. For William Davis, Jefferson Davis is an enigma only to those 
who seek to fit him into a mold that he was not cast from.9 Much like Lee, the mythical Davis is 
quite distinct from the real man. 
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So, who are Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee? On the surface, they are the 
Confederacy’s President and most famous general, respectively. But beyond that they are two 
figures burdened with over 150 years of analysis and interpretation that has given rise to opposite 
mythologies. Lee is the “Reluctant Confederate” who could do no wrong and Davis is the 
embodiment of everything wrong with the antebellum South. Attempts to strip away these 
mythologies have led to Davis being lauded as a great man for his accomplishments while Lee 
becomes a flawed individual, the perfect marble man being scrutinized for every flaw.  
In truth, the two men are more alike than dislike. Both were Southerners who participated 
in the slave system and thought of it as, if not a good thing, then a necessary thing for their 
economy and the enslaved people themselves. This was, after all, standard belief among 
slaveholders at the time. Both men supported the Southern cause during the secession crisis, but 
neither believed in secession as the solution when it began, each hoping that bipartisan 
compromise could be reached without rebellion and war. Each man came to believe over the 
course of the secession crisis that compromise was not possible and sided with the new 
Confederacy because their sympathies laid with the South. After the war, both men maintained 
the belief that the South, and therefore they themselves, had done no wrong. They resumed their 
antebellum calls for peaceful compromise, since they had just fought a war that they had wanted 
to prevent the outbreak of and did not wish to see another war so soon after the first one. 
Ultimately, Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee are not inscrutable enigmas, they are not idealized 
marble men, they are no more heroes than they are villains, instead they are merely ordinary men 
in extraordinary circumstances. 
A note on subject matter before we begin. This essay will primarily focus on three 
periods in the lives of Lee and Davis. The secession crisis surrounding the election of 1860, the 
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final days of the war in April of 1865, and the two men’s return to civilian life after the war and 
their personal reflections on the causes of the war. This essay will not be going into detail on the 
war itself, and Davis and Lee’s differing strategies for the war. There is good scholarship on this 
out there already, and the focus of this essay is intended to be on the most life-changing decision 
these two men made, the choice to secede, why they made it, and how they justified it after the 
fact. 
Early Life 
Robert E. Lee was born in Virginia on January 19th, 1807.10 His lineage could be traced 
to important members of the Revolutionary Army and to the leadership of the Virginia Colony 
well before the revolution.11 He graduated from West Point in 1829 and served with distinction 
during the Mexican-American War.12 He was promoted to colonel, served for almost three years 
as superintendent at West Point, and was in charge of putting down John Brown’s raid at Harpers 
Ferry, Virginia. Lee was posted to San Antonio, Texas in early 1861 when secession began.13 
 Jefferson Davis was born in Kentucky on June 3rd, 1808.14 Unlike Lee, Davis could not 
trace his lineage to anyone of major historical significance. Davis’ father was a relatively 
successful farmer with ten children, at most a dozen slaves, and had owned a series of large 
farms as he moved from Kentucky to Louisiana and, ultimately, Mississippi, where Jefferson 
Davis spent much of his upbringing.15 He entered Transylvania University in Kentucky at the 
age of fourteen, but when his father died two years later, he left Transylvania for West Point at 
the insistence of his elder brother Joseph.16 Davis graduated from West Point in 1828, and was 
posted to Missouri.17 He would serve in various places on the frontier during a seven-year 
military career, but left the army to marry his fiancée Knox Taylor and move onto his brother 
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Joseph’s plantation. He and his wife would both come down with malaria shortly after their 
marriage, and tragically, Knox passed away in September of 1835.18  
 With a plot of land and money to purchase slaves given to him by Joseph, Jefferson 
Davis began to build a successful plantation he called Brierfield.19 At the age of thirty-five, he 
ran for a seat in the Mississippi House of Representatives on the Democratic ticket, but 
ultimately lost.20 In 1844, shortly before marrying his second wife, Davis was appointed as an 
elector for the upcoming presidential election.21 This was but the beginning of a career in politics 
for Davis. Like Lee, he served with distinction during the Mexican-American War but turned 
down a promotion to brigadier general to return to politics, becoming secretary of war under 
Franklin Pierce and serving in the Senate on the Military Affairs Committee.  
 November 6th, 1860 was a day that would change the trajectories of Davis and Lee’s lives 
forever, for that was the day Abraham Lincoln was elected President. Less than two months later, 
on December 20th, South Carolina seceded from the Union, followed by Mississippi, Louisiana, 
Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and Texas in January. The capture of Fort Sumter by Confederate 
forces in April, and subsequent call to arms by President Lincoln pushed North Carolina, 
Virginia, Tennessee, and Arkansas to secede shortly thereafter. 
Lee Secedes 
 Lee was very concerned about the state and future of the union during this time. Writing 
on November 24th, 1860 to his son Custis from his post in Texas, Lee notes that “The Southern 
States seem to be in a convulsion…. My little personal troubles sink into insignificance when I 
contemplate the condition of my country, and I feel as if I could easily lay down my life for its 
safety.”22 Here, Lee does not yet espouse his later opinion of loyalty to Virginia over the Union, 
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but maintains a position that rebellion in the South is something he would fight against. On 
December 4th, President Buchanan proposed a threefold compromise on the issue of slavery: 
recognition of the right to own slaves in all states, present and future, where it existed or would 
exist; popular sovereignty in the territories to determine their status on slavery; and enforcement 
of federal fugitive slave laws overriding state laws to the contrary.23 He wrote again to Custis on 
the 14th, on his support for President Buchanan’s platform, writing: “The three propositions of 
the President are eminently just, are in accordance with the Constitution, and ought to be 
cheerfully assented to by all the States.” Immediately afterward, though, he notes grimly “But I 
do not think the Northern and Western States will agree to them.”24 Lee did not wish to see his 
country embroiled in Civil War; he remained optimistic at this time that the problem could be 
solved through compromise as it had in the past. It was around this time that Lee first declared 
that his first loyalty was to Virginia, in conversation with a staunchly Pro-Union colleague.25 
 When secession became a reality in January, Lee continued to articulate his thoughts in 
letters to his family. In a letter written January 22nd to his cousin Martha Williams, he continues 
to hope for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, while admitting he has sympathy for the 
southern cause, saying: “…I believe that the South justly complains of the aggressions of the 
North, & I have believed that the North would cheerfully redress the grievances complained of. I 
see no cause of disunion, strife & civil war & pray it may be averted.”26 While Lee had sympathy 
for the Southern cause, he disagreed with secession and the rising tide of Civil War. He held out 
hope for a peaceful resolution to the tension. However, he takes a position elsewhere in the letter 
that would have great repercussions several months later: “If a disruption takes place, I shall go 
back in sorrow to my people & share the misery of my native state[.]”27 Lee would continue to 
reiterate these positions in further letters. Writing on January 23rd to his family, he notes, “The 
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South, in my opinion, has been aggrieved by the acts of the North, as you say. I feel the 
aggression, and am willing to take every proper step for redress….As an American citizen, I take 
great pride in my country, her prosperity and institutions, and would defend any state if her rights 
were invaded.”28 Lee’s words here evoke the classic Southern defense of secession, citing 
Northern aggression and states’ rights. Lee, however, tempers his words, unlike some of the 
more hawkish Confederates, by emphasizing his commitment to a peaceful solution. He 
continues, “I hope…that all constitutional means will be exhausted before there is a resort to 
force.”29 Lee in 1861 did not believe secession was the solution, instead he believed that the 
issues at hand could be solved through political compromise. However, he felt as though he was 
powerless to make a difference, writing, “I must be patient and await the end, for I can do 
nothing to hasten or retard it.”30 He therefore chose to side with Virginia whatever side the state 
would take in the conflict, essentially putting the issue of what he would do if civil war broke out 
outside of his hands. Being supportive of the Southern cause but not of its methods, Lee 
doubtlessly faced an internal struggle over where his loyalties should lie. By choosing to side 
with Virginia, regardless of its decision, he solved his dilemma by not taking a side, such that he 
could claim reluctance no matter which cause he supported. But at the same time, he could in 
this way maintain loyalty to at the very least his home state. 
 Throughout the months of March and April, Lee formed a consistent opinion on the 
ongoing secession crisis. In a letter to his sister Anne Marshall dated April 20th, 1861, he states, 
“I had to meet the question whether I should take part against my native State…. I have not been 
able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children and my home.”31 
That same day, he resigned from the Union army. Two days later, before his resignation had 
even been approved, he had accepted an appointment as the commander of the military and naval 
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forces of seceded Virginia.32 Lee’s secession, especially its rapidity, has puzzled scholars for 
decades. After all, Lee said himself that he saw secession as “naught but revolution.” His loyalty 
to Virginia goes part of the way to answering this question, but not all the way. As quoted 
earlier, Lee stated he had no desire to fight again except in defense of his home state of Virginia. 
He had opinions on the factors that led to the Civil War but saw no desire to act on them unless 
his home state was directly involved. When President Lincoln raised a militia force to put down 
secession on April 12th, 1861, and on April 18th Virginia seized the Federal arsenal at Harpers 
Ferry making the state functionally at war with the Union,33 Lee must have felt that the die was 
cast. Virginia had chosen to secede, and he had followed the state’s decision, as he had made up 
his mind to do. Furthermore, Lee stated in the January 23rd letter that “[A] Union that can only be 
maintained by swords and bayonets, and in which strife and civil war are to take the place of 
brotherly love and kindness, has no charm for me.” He then reiterated his plan to side with 
Virginia if the Union were to be “dissolved.”34 Lee saw the secession of the Southern states as 
the end of the country he loved. With his sympathies laying chiefly with the South, and the 
actions of the Union government conforming to everything he had hoped would not come from 
the crisis, Lee’s belief in the Union was shattered. The United States he knew, loved and 
defended was no more. But he still believed in his home state of Virginia, and let that state lead 
him into the crucible. 
Davis Secedes 
 During his antebellum political career, Jefferson Davis spoke often and lovingly of the 
bond between the United States. Unlike some rabid secessionists, Davis did not see the industrial 
North and agricultural South as incompatible; he maintained that their different economic 
systems complemented each other well, leading to growth of the country as a whole. The North 
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and South had coexisted for decades and he saw no reason why this could not continue.35 Davis 
did not see his fellow Southerners as aggressors, to him they were simply demanding a 
constitutional right. Northern abolitionists were the aggressors, especially men like John Brown. 
His greatest concern in 1860 was the possibility that the abolitionists could elect one of their own 
as president in that year’s election.36 
 Secessionist sentiment was strong in Davis’ state of Mississippi, and this led him to walk 
a thin tightrope between his loyalty to Mississippi and to the Union. As a result, Davis’ rhetoric 
to Mississippian audiences is noticeably different from his rhetoric in the Senate. To an audience 
in Vicksburg on November 27th, 1858, he proclaimed that, should an abolitionist president be 
elected, he “would rather appeal to the God of Battles at once than attempt to live any longer in 
such a Union.”37 Davis was always careful, unlike some of his contemporaries, to not mention 
the Republican party by name, referring only to abolitionists. Still, his words in the Senate were 
much more careful, saying only that he would support secession if someone became president, 
“not to administer [the government] according to the constitution, but to pervert it to our 
destruction, to make this Government one of hostility to us.”38 While he was much more obvious 
in his meanings when talking to his Mississippian constituents, Davis was a career politician at 
this point, and he knew how to maneuver. His words in the Senate were, to use a modern term, a 
“dog whistle.” Secessionists could hear those words and know that Davis supported their cause, 
but Davis was left with plausible deniability if he were ever questioned by his peers in the 
Senate. 
 As the election of 1860 drew ever closer, Davis campaigned all over Mississippi for John 
C. Breckenridge, the candidate nominated by the Southern wing of the Democratic Party. Davis’ 
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rhetoric in the final days of the campaign bear a superficial similarity to Lee’s resolution to 
follow Virginia whatever path she took. Speaking at Vicksburg, Davis claimed, 
“If Mississippi in her sovereign capacity decides to submit to the rule of an 
arrogant and sectional North, then I will sit me down as one upon whose brow the 
brand infamy and degradation has been written, and bear my portion of the bitter 
trial. But, if on the other hand, Mississippi decides to resist the hands that would 
tarnish her star on the national flag, then I will come at your bidding, whether by 
day or by night, and pluck that star from the galaxy, and place it upon a banner of 
its own.”39 
Where Lee’s decision to follow his native state wherever she would lead him was the private 
musings of a conflicted man, Davis’ declaration of the same is the rhetoric of a politician. Davis 
chooses his language to present one of Mississippi’s two options as far worse than the other, 
showing a clear preference for what he believes is Mississippi’s best course of action. Where Lee 
finds himself torn between two poor choices, Davis sees no choice at all. It is obvious to Davis 
that Mississippi must secede to preserve her constitutional rights, and his speech is not merely a 
declaration of this opinion, it is a rallying cry and an argument that his fellow Mississippians 
should follow him down that path. 
 Still, even after Lincoln was elected, Davis was not as gung-ho for secession as some of 
his fellow Mississippians. He preferred to wait on secession until it was clear that no hope of 
peaceful compromise remained between North and South.40 He served on the Committee of 
Thirteen during the last days of the Buchanan administration, a bipartisan congressional 
committee attempting to create legislation that would solve the issue of slavery in the territories. 
It was serving on this committee that would convince him that there was no compromise with the 
Republicans.41 Afterwards, Davis made little secret his opinion on Mississippian secession. He 
became quite active in the preparations thereof. In early January of 1861, he was confined to bed 
due to facial neuralgia. When, on January 19th, he received word that Mississippi had seceded, he 
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made his way there two days later despite protests from his physician. On February 9th, he 
received a telegram that he had been chosen as President of the newly-formed Confederate States 
of America. One week later, he arrived in Montgomery to assume the presidency.42  
April and May 1865-The War Ends 
 One of the great ironies of Lee’s service in the Civil War is that while he fought long and 
hard to defend the Confederacy, he personally believed the war to be impossible to win, perhaps 
as early as the beginning of the war. He certainly claimed as much in the war’s immediate 
aftermath.43 This poses a twofold question: why did Lee continue the war when he believed it to 
be unwinnable and why did he change his mind and surrender at Appomattox Courthouse on 
April 9th, 1865? 
 Nolan, in his discussion of Lee, briefly brings up a point made by Frank Vandiver that 
Lee “embodied southern hopes in the public mind. He, and by extension his army, were more 
symbols than realities.”44 More so than any other general, or even President Davis, Lee was the 
Southern Cause incarnate during the war. There would had been enormous pressure on him to 
continue the fight and succeed. Even if he personally felt like the cause was lost, he had a duty to 
the Confederate civilians and government to continue the fight. And the concept of duty was an 
integral part of Southern honor at the time. 
 However, Lee had a duty to both the civilians he fought to protect and the soldiers under 
his command. As the war dragged on, the soldiers under Lee’s command began to make their 
displeasure known. Many deserted, and those that stayed were often weakened and lacked 
morale. Furthermore, the cost of the war on the civilian population was mounting 
exponentially.45 On the one hand, Lee had a duty to the Confederacy to continue the war so long 
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as its leadership believed victory possible. On the other hand, Lee could see the writing on the 
wall. Civilian populations were losing faith, as were his troops. The death toll was mounting, as 
was the damage to infrastructure. The sense of duty Lee felt to continue the war was coming into 
conflict with his sense of duty to protect the South. After all, as stated above, he had joined the 
war effort to defend Virginia. 
 Why then did Lee wait until Appomattox to surrender? It’s possible he spent some time 
ruminating on the decision, caught between two duties as mention above. It’s possible that he 
was blinded to the suffering his prolonging of the war was causing until something opened his 
eyes. But perhaps he protracted the war on purpose. As mentioned in more detail below, 
President Davis was insistent in public that the war could and would continue until victory. With 
such an insistent force arguing for the war to continue, Lee must have felt that his surrender 
would only be accepted by Davis and the Confederacy at large if it came during a period when 
all hope was lost. Any earlier, and the hawkish Confederates could drag him through the mud 
and ruin his social standing for surrendering.  
By Contrast, even after being forced to abandon Richmond, the Confederate Capital, on 
April 2nd, 1865 due to the advances of Union Generals Grant and Sherman, Davis did not believe 
the Confederate cause to be lost. In a proclamation to his citizens, he stressed that the war had 
merely entered “a new phase…the memory of which is to endure for all ages, and to shed ever 
increasing lustre [sic] upon our country.”46 Davis knew that morale was the most important 
resource to the Confederacy at this stage of the war. Any decision he made had to be framed 
positively or risk his civilian population giving up. Even after receiving word on the 9th that Lee 
had surrendered, Davis refused to give in. After relocating his Government once more, he fully 
intended to continue the fight. His cabinet, however, believed the war was lost.47 Davis insisted 
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to the end that the Confederacy could be saved by some miracle, and insisted that the fight be 
kept up until the end, at least publicly. 
In a letter to his wife written April 23rd, 1865, Davis reveals a private struggle behind his 
defiant rhetoric. He writes, “The issue is one which it is very painful for me to meet. On one 
hand is the long night of oppression which will follow the return of our people to the "Union"; on 
the other, the suffering of the women and children, and carnage among the few brave patriots 
who would still oppose the invader, and who, unless the people would rise en-masse to sustain 
them, would struggle but to die in vain.”48 Publicly, Davis insisted the fight continue, but 
privately he was torn. He knew that the return of the South into the Union would be disastrous 
for the Southern states, but at the same time felt that the suffering caused by continuing the 
struggle was enormous. Davis found himself in a situation where there was no easy answer to the 
problem he faced. As stated above, he still held out for a miracle to save the Confederacy. Davis 
had faith in the Southern cause even when all of his generals and advisors had lost theirs. To 
surrender would be to admit that his cause was not just, to admit that he had failed. 
Lee After the War 
 The traditional image of Lee after the war is that of Lee the conciliator, who urged his 
fellow Southerners to abandon their animosity towards the Union. Like any traditional view of a 
historical figure, it is open to criticism. On August 24th, 1865, Lee became President of 
Washington College in Lexington, Virginia, a small university that had suffered much during the 
war. It was a position he would hold until his death in 1870.49 In his acceptance letter to the 
trustees of Washington College, Lee articulated the conciliatory attitude he is remembered for, 
saying, “I think it the duty of every citizen, in the present condition of the country, to do all in his 
power to aid in the restoration of peace and harmony, and in no way to oppose the policy of the 
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State or [Federal] Governments, directed to that object.”50 He expressed similar sentiments in an 
August 28th, 1865 letter to former governor John Letcher of Virginia, writing “The questions 
which for years were in dispute between the State and General Governments…having been 
decided against us, it is the part of wisdom to acquiesce in the result, and of candor to recognize 
the fact.”51 On September 7th, he reiterated this in a letter to former confederate naval captain 
Josiah Tatnall, saying “The war being at an end, the Southern States having laid down their arms 
and the questions at issue between them and the Northern States having been decided, I believe it 
to be the duty of every one to unite in the restoration of the country and the reestablishment of 
peace and harmony.”52 Lee’s encouragement of conciliation primarily focuses on the avoidance 
of a second Civil War, which makes sense when one recalls that Lee had hoped for a peaceful 
resolution to the secession crisis in 1861. 
 While Lee urged conciliation, he never denied that the South was justified in its actions. 
In a letter to Jefferson Davis’ wife posted February 23, 1866, while her husband was imprisoned, 
Lee wrote, “I have felt most keenly the sufferings and imprisonment of your husband….He 
enjoys the sympathy and respect of all good men; and if, as you state, his trial is now near, the 
exhibition of the whole truth in his case will, I trust, prove his defense and justification.”53 Here, 
Lee affirms that he has no doubt that any trial Jefferson Davis would undergo would find him 
acquitted, and his actions, and therefore those of the South as a whole, justified. In 1868, 
Alexander H. Stephens published A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States, 
outlining his defense of secession as a constitutional right. On November 8, 1869, in a letter to 
General E. G. W. Butler, Lee discussed Stephens’ book, saying, “I have not read the work of Mr. 
A. H. Stephens, but from what I have seen of it I think it a strong exposition of Southern views 
on the subject…I think the South is indebted to him for his defense of her opinions and acts.”54 
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After war’s end, Lee never denied that the South was justified in its decision to secede; rather, he 
upheld it as a constitutional right. 
 Close examination of Lee’s writings after the war reveal that losing the war did little, if 
anything, to change his opinions on the causes of the war. As mentioned above, he maintained 
for the rest of his life that secession was constitutionally justified. He had no desire for freedmen 
to become his equal. In an appearance before a congressional subcommittee on Reconstruction in 
1866, Lee stated, “I think it would be better for Virginia if she could get rid of [the freedmen 
population].” He also responded in the affirmative when asked if he felt that the freedmen 
population posed a threat to Virginia’s continued well-being.55 Lee’s racism is not out of the 
ordinary for a man of his time and place, nor is it a new phenomenon for him. In an infamous 
letter to his wife dated December 27, 1856, Lee states his belief in slavery as an evil thing, but 
continues, “I think it however a greater evil to the white than the Black race….The blacks are 
immeasurably better off here than in Africa.”56 Again, this is not an uncommon viewpoint for a 
Southerner of the time to possess. Like many slaveholding Southerners, Lee justifies the practice 
of slavery with the biased claim that forced servitude is somehow a force for good in the lives of 
the enslaved, and that it is a heavy burden on the white man’s shoulders to do so. Lee’s attitude 
is no different than that of countless other Southerners whose names are not remembered. Losing 
the Civil War in no way changed Lee’s opinions on secession, slavery, white supremacy, or any 
of the issues of the war. 
 Was Lee the mythic “Great Conciliator?” Only in that he did not wish there to be another 
war. Lee was willing to admit that the South had lost the battle for slavery. But that was where 
his admission of defeat ended. Losing the Civil War did not make Lee into a paragon of peaceful 
conciliation. He held to his attitudes from before the war: that the federal government, and 
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therefore the North, should not interfere with Southern matters; that the white race was superior 
to the black; and that Southern Secession was justified under the constitution. Lee was not a 
Reluctant Confederate as much as he was a Reluctant Soldier. Lee’s calls for peaceful 
reconciliation after the war are much the same as his hope for peaceful resolution to the 
secession crisis: the hope of a man who knows the horror of war that the nation’s conflicts can be 
resolved at the ballot box and debate stage rather than the battlefield.  
Davis After the War 
 While Lee was able to return to civilian life shortly after the war, Davis was one of the 
few Confederates not pardoned by President Andrew Johnson. Davis was imprisoned pending 
trial from May 10th, 1865 to May 13th, 1867, when he was released on bail.57 Imprisonment did 
little to damper Davis’ appeal among his supporters. If anything, it strengthened his image. Davis 
had been respected as President of the Confederacy by Southerners, but never beloved. But in his 
imprisonment Davis became a symbol of the fallen Confederacy, a martyr and a rallying point 
for Southerners. Many of them agreed with Lee’s assessment quoted above that an acquittal for 
Davis would be an acquittal for the South as a whole.58 Through correspondence with his wife 
while imprisoned, Davis was aware of efforts to acquit him. Still, he was unafraid to serve as a 
martyr for the confederate cause, writing on February 17th of 1866 that “Oftentimes the question 
occurs to me, would the spirit of vengeance be satiated by my sacrifice so that my family and 
countrymen would then be left in peace. If so, I trust my past life will bring others to the 
conclusion that is embodied in the mental answer I have so often made, and that those who 
would mourn me longest would least expect or desire me to shrink from the purchase.”59 Davis 
was unsure of his future during his imprisonment, especially as it took two years for his case to 
even make it to trial. Here, he makes the ultimate show of support to the Confederate cause, 
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offering himself willingly to anger of the North, so long as it meant that the remainder of the 
South would be spared from Northern retribution. He was unafraid to sacrifice himself for his 
cause, and he believed that this was what was expected of him. Even if he were afraid, he 
believed his supporters expected and needed him to do so. If his supporters viewed Davis as the 
Confederate cause incarnate in the postbellum years, Davis himself saw that cause as bigger than 
himself or any one human, he knew it could survive without him. Further, ever the politician, he 
knew if he were executed it would reinvigorate the South against Reconstruction. He was more 
valuable to his cause as a martyr than as a leader. 
 Davis’ trial would be delayed numerous times following his release, until President 
Johnson issued a guarantee of total amnesty to all participants in the rebellion on December 25th, 
1868. Previous pardons had excluded those on trial for treason, like Davis, but with this 
announcement, Davis ceased to face charges for treason. However, he was having difficulty 
returning to civilian life. Needing a source of income to replace slave-based agriculture, Davis 
made several business investments that went nowhere.60 Like other former Confederates, Davis 
looked to Reconstruction as the source of both his misfortune and that of the South as a whole, 
writing on August 1st, 1867, “My thoughts are ever turned to our oppressed countrymen and my 
prayers are daily offered for their restoration to freedom and prosperity.”61 Davis here displays a 
somewhat naïve hope that a rough approximation of the antebellum status quo can be achieved in 
the South, born of the Southern insistence that they had done no wrong in seceding.  
 In October of 1869, Davis accepted a position as President of the Carolina Life Insurance 
Company. He would hold the position for almost four years before resigning amid the Panic of 
1873.62 He would not be employed again until January of 1876, when he accepted the Presidency 
of the International Chamber of Commerce and Mississippi Valley Society.63 In 1881 Davis 
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published his two-volume work, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. Part memoir, 
part treatise, it served as an extensive justification for the Confederacy’s actions in seceding from 
the Union. Davis’ main argument therein was that secession was constitutional. He believed that 
proving that point would vindicate the South and reveal the North as the true belligerents. He 
downplayed the role of Slavery, writing, “the existence of African servitude was in no [way] the 
cause of the conflict.”64 This denial, of course, contradicts numerous statements from 
Confederates from before the war, but it is important to note for the larger context of the 
postbellum South. The South could not justify their actions if those actions were in defense of a 
practice now illegal under the constitution. Southerners would have to determine an alternate 
explanation for their actions that would seem noble and defensible to Northern ears. Very 
quickly, they settled on States’ Rights. Davis was no exception. 
 Furthermore, Davis never denied that secession was a constitutional right. He insisted 
that the states were “the sovereign parties to the compact of union,”65 meaning they were 
autonomous and could enter and leave the Union at any time. This principle of autonomy was the 
core of Davis’ argument in support of secession. As independent entities in a larger compact, the 
states had a right to leave that compact if it threatened their livelihood. Davis saw secession as no 
different than the original colonies declaring independence from England. In his view, the 
federal government had become destructive of the rights of states, and like the founding fathers 
before him, Davis and his fellow Confederates had abolished that government to protect those 
rights. Davis did not see himself as a traitor or a rebel. Even when he died in December 1889, he 
maintained that his actions were those of a patriot. 
Conclusion 
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 The Civil War shaped Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis’ lives in a way nothing else 
they encountered did. On the one hand, it made them household names into the present day. On 
the other hand, it associated them with what was essentially an armed revolt against the 
government in defense of the enslavement of human beings. Despite that, both men became 
mythologized figures immediately following the war. Davis became the Lost Cause incarnate, a 
representative of the Confederate Cause as a whole. For former Confederates during 
Reconstruction, and later Southern apologists writing biographies, if you could redeem Jefferson 
Davis, you could redeem the Confederacy as a whole. In a pushback battle of the history books, 
Davis became mythologized as an inscrutable enigma, the so-called “Sphinx of the 
Confederacy.” His motives and action thus became unknowable to us mere mortals, and in a 
way,  this moved him beyond criticism. 
 Lee became even more mythologized than Davis. Where Davis became an enigma, Lee 
became the “Reluctant Confederate” and the “Marble Man,” a great man who could do no 
wrong, whose every action was justified and who both embodied the Southern cause and 
supported because of duty only, rather than true belief in it. Lee had been placed on a pedestal so 
high that no historian could reach him. Every inherent contradiction in the man was brushed 
aside in the name on promoting him as a great man. 
 But when one moves past this cult of enigmatic perfection, one finds two men struggling 
with inner conflict and impossible decisions. Davis and Lee both entered the secession crisis in 
1861 with a desire to maintain the Union despite their sympathies lying wholly with the South. 
Both men insisted that peaceful compromise was the solution as it had been in the past and 
joined the secessionist train only when they believed all hope of compromise was gone. Both 
blamed the North and the Republican party for refusing to compromise, not their fellow 
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Southerners. But when the choice came down to between their country and their state, both men 
wholeheartedly chose their state. 
 Both men faced a similar crisis in the last month of the war. All factors indicated that the 
South could not achieve victory. Davis and Lee both faced the decision whether to fight on and 
risk total destruction for a slim chance at success, or to admit defeat and face the unknown that 
was Union victory. While the two men chose different paths, Lee surrendering while Davis 
fought on until his capture, both faced a difficult decision in the last days of the war. 
 Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee are not perfect, marble men, immune to criticism, nor 
are they unknowable enigmas beyond our understanding. They are ordinary Southern men of 
their time. They both held the traditional Southern views on slavery: that the white race was 
superior, and that slavery had a net benefit for blacks by exposing them to civilization and 
Christianity. They both defended the secession of the South by claiming it as a constitutional 
right, the “states’ rights” argument trotted out by countless Southern apologists. They both spent 
the remainder of their lives unapologetically believing they, and by extension the South as a 
whole, had done nothing wrong. In essence, Davis and Lee were no different than any number of 
lesser-known confederates like John C. Breckenridge or John Lecter. What set Lee and Davis 
apart from other Confederates was not any sort of moral superiority or resonance, but simply the 
position of power they held. As the President of the Confederacy and its most prominent general, 
Lee and Davis were constantly in the public eye and forced to make decisions with enormous 
ramifications. Their positions of power and notoriety did not make them any better at 
approaching those decisions, and certainly did not make them into gods. Davis and Lee were 
simply ordinary men in extraordinary circumstances.
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